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LAW AND ECONOMICS:
THE LEGACY OF GUIDO CALABRESI
ALAIN MARCIANO*
GIOVANNI B. RAMELLO**
There is no doubt that what is generally known as law and economics is now
a well-established scientific approach, settled in our intellectual landscape. Its
importance is today not only theoretical but also—and quite importantly—
practical. The law-and-economics perspective is so relevant in dealing with
problems arising from everyday-life interactions of human beings embedded in
a given legal setting that it now qualifies as a sort of programmatic approach for
law practitioners and scholars. Indeed, the use of economics—economic
reasoning and economic modeling—as a tool to tackle otherwise difficult and
complex legal problems is now frequent, to say the least. Moreover, an
increasing number of judges and legal scholars have taken economics courses
and are influenced by the material, certainly in the United States and now more
than ever in Europe. Economics did not always have such a role in law.
This change is the result of a movement that began before World War II,
gained structure in the 1950s, took further shape in the 1960s, and established
itself in the 1970s, essentially under the influence of economists and legal
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scholars from the so-called Chicago school, particularly. Ronald Coase and
2
Richard Posner (an economist and a legal scholar, respectively). They and
others helped to create a field of studies at the intersection of economics and
the law. Henry Manne played also a crucial role in the movement, although he
3
is not a Chicagoan.
The other non-Chicagoan founding father of the law-and-economics
4
discipline is Guido Calabresi. Indeed, one cannot—and probably nobody
would—consider the current intense interplay between law and economics
without recognizing the role played by the “outsider” Guido Calabresi, whose
work “enabled Yale to carve out its own niche in the field,” after “the ‘boom’
period of law and economics, the late 1960s and early 1970s, [when] Chicago
5
dominated.” Calabresi really initiated an original approach: of course different
from what most legal scholars did, but also from what economists—Coase, for
6
instance, or Aaron Director—started to do. With his unique approach,
Calabresi somehow simultaneously anticipated and set himself apart from what
Posner did in the early 1970s at Chicago. To put it differently, Calabresi helped
popularize the use of economics to study and analyze legal problems, but did so
7
in his own specific way.
Calabresi’s publishing career started with the remarkable article Some

1. Ronald Coase was awarded the Nobel prize for economics in 1991. Peter Passel, The Nation:
For a Common-Sense Economist, A Nobel – And an Impact in the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991, at
E2. His article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost], is usually viewed as the article that marked the passage from old to new law and
economics. George Stigler, another winner of the Nobel prize for economics, George J. Stigler,
Reflections of a Nobel Prize Winner: The Economist as Preacher, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1982, at 126,
wrote that “[i]n the field of law and/or economics, B.C. means Before Coase.” Law or Economics?, 35
J.L. & ECON. 455, 457 (1992). For a summary and analysis of Coase’s views, see the special issues
published by the Journal of Law and Economics, Markets Firms, and Property Rights: A celebration of
the Research of Ronald Coase, 54 J.L. & ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, and the European Journal of Law
and Economics, Ronald Coase and The Problem of Social Cost, 31 Eur. J.L. & Econ. (ANNIVERSARY
ISSUE) 1.
2. Posner invented what is now know as the economic analysis of law; he was the first to use the
expression for the title of his magnum opus textbook and, as George Stigler wrote in his memoir,
“almost single-handedly has created the field of the economic analysis of the law.” GEORGE J.
STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 160 (1988).
3. See Henry G. Manne, An Intellectual History of the George Mason University School of Law,
GEORGE MASON UN. SCH. L. (1993), http://www.law.gmu.edu/about/history.
4. To be more precise, in 1991, the American Law and Economics Association granted the title of
“founding fathers” of the law and economics movement to Calabresi, Coase, Manne, and Posner. AM.
L. & ECON. ASS’N, http://www.amlecon.org/ (last visited June 25, 2014).
5. LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT AND REVERBERATIONS
243 (2005).
6. See generally Alain Marciano & Giovanni B. Ramello, Consent, Choice, and Guido Calabresi’s
Heterodox Economic Analysis of Law, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 2, 2014 at 97; Steven G.
Medema, Juris Prudence: Calabresi’s Uneasy Relationship with the Coase Theorem, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 2, 2014 at 65.
7. See generally Marciano & Ramello, supra note 6; Medema, supra note 6.
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Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts (Some Thoughts) —written
in the 50s when Calabresi was still a student, and published in 1961—in which
he provided many seeds that in the subsequent five decades have germinated,
transforming a fragile bud of an idea into a mature and robust discipline. This
probably explains why, more than fifty years later, the article is still worth
reading—for its legal dimension, for how it mixes a legal and an economic
reasoning, and also for broader, let us say, ethical and philosophical reasons.
Yet Some Thoughts is remarkable not just because it is foundational for law and
economics, but also because it is foundational for Calabresi. Indeed, a lot of
Calabresi’s ideas about law, economics, justice, liability, and so forth, can be
traced back to this original work. But, returning to the the article’s greater
influence, Some Thoughts had a huge impact on lawyers and economists, both
inside the United States and outside it—especially in Europe. All this influence
is the subject of this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems: The authors in
this issue trace the impact and the legacy of Calabresi’s 1961 article and, more
broadly, of Calabresi himself, of his specific way of applying economics to legal
problem solving. The goal of the authors in this issue is to analyze the origins
and influence of Calabresi’s works, their ideological, technical, and
methodological aspects, as well as the connections, similarities, and differences
between Calabresis’s works and the other major works in law and economics or
economic analyses of the law. Put more simply, the authors in this issue
evaluate Calabresi’s legacy in the academia. Scholars from different fields using
different methodologies propose a multifaceted view of Calabresi’s
contributions to legal studies and to law and economics.
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems starts with Guido Calabresi’s
own article, entitled A Broader View of the Cathedral: The Significance of the
Liability Rule, Correcting a Misapprehension—a significant title indeed,
revealing how important and even necessary it still remains for Calabresi, after
9
more than fifty years of work and writings, to clarify his views. This is not to say
that Calabresi’s views were not clear; rather, as is the case with all important
scholars (especially judges), there is always room for interpretation. Calabresi’s
clarification begins with the premise that torts scholars who view the area as
one of private law (for example, those who assert that torts is only about just
compensation, or that it is only about redressing private wrongs) miss the public
function of the field, a function that would remain there even if the private link
10
between injurers and victims were eliminated.
After showing this
misapprehension for what it is, Calabresi then demonstrates the public function
of torts: The liability rule (in both torts and in takings and eminent-domain
law), is not used principally, much less solely, to approach the result that would
occur in a free market of consensual exchanges (were such a market available),
but is instead used approach inalienability (that is, a fully collective result) in
8. 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
9. 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 1.
10. Id. at 2–3.
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those instances when a criminal-law solution is not desired. Calabresi expands
on this argument by showing that the liability rule (of the collectively set price)
is used to achieve goals that are neither purely libertarian nor purely
12
collectivist, but are properly viewed as social democratic. With this last
argument, Calabresi sets the tone of this issue of Law and Contemporary
Problems and also provides evidence useful in resolving one of its central topics:
namely, where he stands between the “left” and the “right,” between critical
legal studies and Chicago neoclassical law and economics.
Part of the answer lies in Calabresi’s personal history. In effect, even if
technical and methodological analyses are necessary to make sense of his ideas,
they do not suffice. Laura Kalman, in her contribution to this issue of Law and
Contemporary Problems, provides just such a personal history, in the form of
13
what may very well be the first intellectual biography of Calabresi. Many of
the details and insights provided by Kalman cannot be found in previously
published articles and books, and yet they are critical to explaining the
foundations of his Calabresi’s research. Kalman structures her article by using
historical detail to link Calabresi’s life and career to important influencing
14
elements, paramount among them, Yale. Yale in the 1950s and 1960s, after
Calabresi’s family had left Italy, fleeing fascism, such that Calabresi was in a
15
sense a refugee and an outsider. Yale also in the sense of a place different than
16
Chicago. In effect, in 1960, Edward Levi offered Calabresi a tenured position
17
at Chicago. Calabresi was only twenty-eight years old. He had not even
18
published his first article. Yet he turned Levi’s offer down. He wanted to stay
at Yale, where he had his American roots and where he would eventually spend
19
his entire career. Although it is hard to tell how and to what extent all this
influenced Calabresi, it is equally impossible to ignore these events. For these
reasons, Kalman’s article provides a perspective critical for understanding the
scholarship of Calabresi.
James Hackney’s contribution provides a complement to this historical
perspective by locating Calabresi’s contribution in the American legal
20
scholarship. And, besides situating Calabresi’s, Hackney’s historical sketches

11. Id. at 8–9.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Laura Kalman, Some Thoughts on Yale and Guido, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014
at 15.
14. Id. at 15.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 40–41.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. James R. Hackney, Jr., Guido Calabresi and the Construction of Contemporary American
Legal Theory, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 45.
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also depict the broader intellectual milieu in which Calabresi wrote. Hackney
tries to determine where Calabresi stood and how he navigated between critical
22
legal studies, liberal-rights theory and law and economics. In the course of his
analysis, Hackney shows that Calabresi was subject to criticisms from the left—
where critical legal theorists criticized “the law-and-economics enterprise as an
23
attempt to mask politics in the form of science” —and also from neoclassical
24
economists like Posner, with whom Calabresi reciprocally disagreed. Hackney
shows how Calabresi answered these criticisms and, following a “long and
25
winding” path, built his own legal theory. One important element of
Calabresi’s contribution to law and economics emphasized by Hackney is
26
Calabresi’s “creative use of economic analysis with realist insights.” This
probably explains why, in the 1960s, Calabresi was pioneering something akin
to what we could today define a behavioral approach in law and economics. At
27
least, this is one of Hackney’s conclusions.
Steven Medema’s article also deals with the differences between Calabresi,
28
Coase, and Posner, and each’s respective views on law and economics.
Medema analyzes a very interesting matter, namely the past and future
29
perception of Calabresi as one of the inventor of the Coase theorem. Professor
30
Kalman’s article provides some evidence of this perception, and Medema
explores the view through a methodical reading of Calabresi’s writings in light
of the similarities and the differences that exist between Calabresi’s ideas and
the Coase theorem, all the while taking care to conduct his analysis at a
historical level, without an ideological dimension. Medema illustrates that
Calabresi’s understanding of the Coase theorem evolved over time: that
Calabresi “increasingly converged toward Coase’s larger message in The
Problem of Social Cost and away from the silliness that makes up so much of
31
the commentary, pro and con, on the Coase theorem.” Medema further
specifies what, exactly, Coase’s larger message was, and concludes that
Calabresi is close to Coase—at least to the “real” one who can be found in the
original versions of his works rather than to the narrow and standard version of
Coase that can be found, for instance, in Stigler’s account of the Coase
32
theorem. Medema’s view of the two Coase’s echoes what Calabresi said in

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 47–52.
Id. at 54–62.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Medema, supra note 6, at 65.
Kalman, supra note 13, at 33–36.
Medema, supra note 28, at 94.
Id. at 92–95.
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966).
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1991 when he identified the “young socialist” of The Nature of the Firm and
35
the “middle-aged libertarian” of The Problem of Social Cost. Pushing
Medema’s conclusion about which Coase Calabresi agrees with a bit further,
one may say that it also illustrates the distance that separates Calabresi from the
standard, neoclassical approach in economics. This is somewhat different from
Hackney’s thesis, but similar to what Alain Marciano and Giovanni Ramello,
and then Enrico Colombatto, argue.
In their article, Marciano and Ramello follow this implication of Medema’s
conclusion by insisting on the differences between a neoclassical approach to
36
law and economics on the one hand and Calabresi’s view on the other. Their
analysis starts with reminding the reader that mainstream neoclassical
37
economics is limited to analyzing choices made under given conditions.
38
Consent (to those conditions) is not discussed. Put another way, the
straightforward—although not always explicit—assumption is that choosing
39
evidences consent, because dissent would translate into the absence of choice.
Posner’s economic analysis of law and Coase’s law and economics both rely
upon this notion. But this is not the case for Calabresi, who takes a different
view: Consent occupies an important place in Calabresi’s reasoning as early as
Some Thoughts, when, for the first time, besides showing the utility of the
resource-allocation criterion, he emphasizes the importance of considering
40
“starting points” and distributive principles. In Calabresi’s view, the law-andeconomics scholar cannot remain neutral about the distribution of resources.
Colombatto disagrees, stressing in his article that questions about
distribution and justice—upon which Calabresi insists—pertain “to political
41
philosophy, rather than to economics.” According to Colombatto, Calabresi’s
inistence on distributive considerations, besides differentiating Calabresi from
neoclassical scholars, also differentiates him from free-market advocates—but
in only one, albeit significant, way. Under Calabresi’s approach, the implication
42
is that liability may exist even if there is no injurer. But, according to
Colombatto, that is the only difference between Calabresi and free-market
43
advocates. This is a novel viewpoint worth of attention: By departing from the

33. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211,
1211 (1991).
34. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
35. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 1.
36. Marciano & Ramello, supra note 6.
37. Id. at 101–02.
38. Id. at 102.
39. Id. at 97.
40. Id. at 105.
41. Enrico Colombatto, A Free-Market View on Accidents and Torts, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 117, 132.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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neoclassical vision of the Chicagoans, which is incompatible with free-market
44
tenets, Calabresi “sides with the free-market perspective.” Therefore,
Calabresi’s “way of framing the law-and-economics debate is more fruitful,”
from Colombatto’s libertarian, free-market perspective, “than the standard
45
neoclassical version.” A free-market supporter, argues Colombatto, has much
to learn from Calabresi’s rejection of the neoclassical concepts of efficiency,
wealth creation, and reciprocity—all of which are objectionable from a freemarket perspective because they can be used to advocate violations of freedom
of contract—and also from his analyses of uncertainty, which counsels against
46
regulations and judicial intervention. More broadly, Colombatto’s discussion
implies that the nature of liability and the right to be compensated are not only
technical matters—determined by objective and neutral notions such as wealth
or efficiency or uncertainty or costs—but rest on fundamental, superior, not to
say ideological, principles.
Those principles were present in Calabresi’s mind when he wrote Some
Thoughts. His views about liability and compensation were not guided by
efficiency only. This might be why he paid so much attention to insurance and
also why, as Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi write in their article, he established
47
the “insurance objective of tort liability,” recasting “tort liability as providing
48
an implicit form of insurance.” That this was an important move is evidenced
by the fact that “[t]his framework remains the linchpin of economic theories of
49
tort liability as a compensation mechanism.” Hersch and Viscusi then proceed
by analyzing “[h]ow and when tort liability does in fact serve [Calabresi’s
50
claimed] insurance function.” They conclude that there are circumstances,
situations in which the “insurance objective” of tort liability cannot be
51
fulfilled—because some losses cannot be “fully insured.” For example, on
limitation on insurable losses is that “[i]nsurance is only viable if losses can be
52
anticipated and priced accordingly.” In those cases, other forms of regulation
should be used to complement tort liability. Indeed, Hersch and Viscusi
conclude that “the insurance function of tort liability has limits” and that “tort
liability has a limited constructive role to play,” and add that “there are other
social institutions, such as government regulation, that can serve a constructive
53
function by working in tandem with tort liability.” Despite Hersch and
Viscusi’s conclusion that tort liability’s insurance objective is unfulfillable, they

44. Id.
45. Id. at 133.
46. Id. at 131–33.
47. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Assessing the Insurance Role of Tort Liability after Calabresi, 77
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 135, 135.
48. Id. at 162.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 136.
51. Id. at 162–63.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 163.
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nonetheless assert that “tort liability retains a valuable risk-spreading function
in many situations and may be superior to alternative institutional mechanisms
in fostering incentives”
Mark Geistfeld’s article, the last in this issue of Law and Contemporary
54
Problems, complements Hersch and Viscusi’s. In effect, Geistfeld concludes
the issue by noting that a compensatory tort rule—a tort rule based on the the
55
Pareto principle—cannot be reduced to a form of accident insurance. Thus,
Geistfeld interprets tort law in the compensatory terms of the autonomy-based
Pareto principle—he replaces a welfarist approach to tort law, aimed at
minimizing the social costs of accidents, with a nonwelfarist approach based on
56
individual autonomy and equal freedom. To Geistfeld, the Pareto principle is
appealing because it embodies a form of compensation that can be used to
define a compensatory tort rule “that limits (nonconsensual) compensatory
exchanges to forms of risky behavior that do not disvalue the autonomy of
57
those threatened by the behavior.” Geistfeld then shows that such a rule
distributes risk in a way “that those who benefit from new instances of risk
behavior satisfy the reasonable compensatory demands of those who would
58
otherwise be disadvantaged.” Thus, a compensatory tort rule does not simply
improve the allocation of resources but also contributes to shifting the Pareto
59
frontier outwards. In other words, a compensatory tort rule creates more
wealth for society.

54. Mark A. Geistfeld, Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts: Carrying Calabresi Further, 77
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 165.
55. Id. at 168.
56. Id. at 171–74.
57. Id. at 172.
58. Id. at 188.
59. Id.

